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Terrorists, affordance and the over-estimation of offence homogeneity   
 
Jason Roach, University of Huddersfield 
 
Introduction 
Indeed, a cat doesn’t simply assess a mouse, it assesses it as a prospective meal. But the 
cat doesn’t assess all animals as prospective meals, only mice (Martinez, 2005:53). 
This short quotation taken from the Guillermo Martinez novel, The Oxford Murders, wonderfully 
illustrates ‘affordance’, the central concept of this book. The cat’s perception of the mouse as a 
meal, ‘affords’ the cat a behavioural option of killing and eating it, presumably because the 
mouse is not likely to fight back where other animals might. One can assume that the 
‘affordance’ for the cat would undoubtedly be different if the mouse was two meters tall and 
wielding a baseball bat. If the popular myth propagated by children’s stories is to be believed, 
then may be this explains why elephants are scared of mice. It is they who perceive mice in such 
an intimidating way! 
 As what affordance constitutes is dealt with better by others in this book, it suffices here just to 
say that in its broadest sense, the concept of affordance is taken to be how one’s perceived 
actions are constrained (or in some cases widened) by what one infers others might do in 
particular situations (Pease, 2006 ).  For example, if one perceives a dog to be hostile, then the 
consequent range of possible actions available (i.e. affordance) is likely to be more constrained 
than if it is perceived as friendly or harmless.  
By now the reader is hopefully of the mind that although the word affordance itself may ‘afford’ 
slightly different meaning for writers of the other chapters, sufficient consensus exists to make it 
a concept worth considering when one is trying to understand terrorist behaviour. A common 
thread throughout this book is how different situations and settings can affect the range of 
actions perceived available to those seeking to commit acts of terrorism, an observation that is 
inherently important in the wider objective of preventing them.   
How specific situations and settings might afford the terrorist a certain range of actions is well 
covered elsewhere in this book and is not repeated here. The point of departure for this chapter 
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is instead to focus on the broader issue of how estimations of the offence homogeneity of 
criminals and terrorists might affect the range of afforded actions available, not only for those 
tasked with preventing and countering terrorism, but also for the terrorist. Offence 
homogeneity is where the individual offender ‘specialises’ by committing offences of a same 
type. For example, where a bank robber just ‘robs banks’ and a burglar only burgles (Roach, 
2009).  
The chapter begins with a brief exploration of what affordance might mean in the criminal 
setting and why it should be considered important to understanding and preventing crime, 
before moving to suggest that it should be given equal consideration to the task of 
understanding, preventing and countering terrorism.  
The chapter concludes with the suggestion that, like those seeking to prevent crime, those 
tasked with preventing and countering terrorism will have a common tendency to over-estimate 
the offence homogeneity of offenders, whereas research on criminal careers and recidivism 
suggests the contrary (i.e. offence versatility). How over-estimation of offence homogeneity   
can work to constrain the range of actions afforded to prevent and counter terrorism, whilst at 
the same time expanding the range of actions afforded to the terrorist in a kind of ‘second-order 
affordance’ is briefly introduced here, where those involved in terrorism can commit other types 
of offences safe in the knowledge it is highly unlikely that being caught will unmask them as 
terrorists.   
It is suggested here that by widening the perceptual frame of terrorist offending currently held 
by those charged with countering and preventing such acts, the range of actions afforded will be 
increased as a consequence. It is important, on the other hand, that terrorists continue to think 
that those trying to counter them continue to see them as offence homogenous. Such a second-
order belief (e.g. Cartwright, 2000) broadens the range of actions afforded to counter-terrorism 
by making additional methods of identifying terrorists a more attractive proposition. For 
example, if one takes the premise that those engaged in terrorism only consider vulnerability of 
their exposure when planning and committing acts of terrorism, then, consequently, they are 
unlikely to commit other terrorism unrelated crimes with the same degree of ‘carefulness’. 
Being careless with the commission of their ‘non-terrorist’ crimes makes them vulnerable to 
identification as terrorists by more mainstream policing methods.  Suggestions are made at the 
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end of this chapter, whereby other offences commit by terrorists might be best used against 
them in order to ‘flag up’ further scrutiny which might in turn uncover their terrorist activities.  
Affordance and ‘mind-reading’ 
When the French philosopher René Decartes (1960) decided to doubt his own existence all he 
found was the opposite. He concluded instead that as somebody was doing the doubting (i.e. 
him) then he must exist, leading to the famous proclamation attributed to him, ‘I think therefore 
I am’. Although he might have failed spectacularly in his mission, he did unintentionally illustrate 
what is called ‘second- order intentionality’. This involves self-awareness and the realisation that 
others are similarly aware (Cartwright, 2000). To illustrate the following is borrowed from Roach 
and Pease (currently in press); 
• ‘I think I’m innocent’, is first-order.  
• ‘I think that you think I’m innocent’, is second-order 
•  ‘I think that you think that I think I’m innocent’, is third-order, and, 
• ‘I think that you think that I think that you think I’m innocent’, is fourth-order 
We usually lose the plot around fifth or six– level intentionality. The ability to think beyond first-
level intentionality is an alternative name for Theory of Mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978)  
  
Humphrey (1976) claimed famously that humans do not make complex social world calculations 
merely based on ‘external behaviour’. That is, how we behave is as much a reflection of how we 
perceive others to think and feel as it is based on their ‘outward (visible) behaviour’. Take, for 
example, concern for a friend who has recently split from a long-term partner of whom they are 
still very fond. If they respond to the question ‘how do you feel?’ with ‘never better’, you 
probably would not believe them. You are more likely perhaps to interpret their reply as, ‘I’m 
not too good thank you, in fact I’m a bit of an emotional wreck if truth be known’ (Roach and 
Pease in press). So how do we ‘read minds’ in this way? How are we capable of putting 
ourselves in the place of others and reflecting on how we might think? Because we are blessed 
with what termed as Theory of Mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) and described by Barrett et 
al. (2002) as; 
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This rather awkward term is meant to suggest that the individual has a belief (a theory) 
about the content of (another person’s) mind – in other words, he/she understands that 
other people have mental states (thoughts, desires, beliefs) and that these mental 
states drive their behaviour. More importantly, perhaps, the individual can appreciate 
that, at any one time, the actual content of these mental states can differ considerably 
from our own and from the objective reality of a situation (296-7).  
Put simply, affordance rests on having a Theory of Mind, whereby the individual is able to infer 
or recognise the thoughts and actions of others, which influences the range of actions they 
perceive available to them and consequently their eventual choice of action. For example, 
without Theory of Mind, we would only act according to our own thoughts and feelings and not 
in partial response to those of others. Behaviour would be utterly selfish and altruism would not 
exist 
Ken Pease suggests that affordance is therefore best perhaps understood here as a kind of 
psychology of what actions come to mind in a certain setting (Pease, 2006), rather than in the 
more narrow ‘Gibsonian sense’ of perception per se. Pease (2006) also suggests affordance is 
preferred to opportunity because an opportunity implicitly exists outside people. For example, 
we all have a chance of winning the national lottery providing we buy a ticket.  
Affordance is a perception of what actions come to mind in a particular setting, and is a concept 
well known to designers. The psychologist and designer Donald Norman (1998) gives the 
example of door handles by way of illustration. A plate on a door affords pushing where a 
handle affords pulling (Norman, 1998). 
Affordance, crime and the criminal setting 
 In this chapter affordance in a criminal context is taken to be to be simply the range of 
behaviours that an individual might consider if they perceive situations in particular ways. For 
example, with the classic ‘broken window’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1995) 
where run down, vandalized and generally uncared for environments afford better 
opportunities to engage in crime and disorder without much risk of reproach, for some at least. 
The gist of the thinking being that if people do not care for a particular area then they are a) not 
likely to spend much time in it (so little risk of observing our individual up to no good) and b) 
even less likely to waste breath bothering to complain and challenge what goes on within it. The 
broken windows hypothesis is founded on the notion that a rundown damaged building (or 
area) will afford damage in a way that an undamaged one does not (Kelling and Coles, 1995). 
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Similarly, the social psychologist Philip Zimbardo found in an experiment that the perception of 
a vehicle with a missing wheel afforded vandalism and theft opportunities that a complete 
vehicle did not (1973; 2007). Nee and Meenaghan (2006) in their study of decision making in 
burglars found that those more experienced processed faster cognitively relevant stimuli and 
cues available from settings when searching for targets, suggesting expertise. These examples 
lead Pease to suggest,  
‘Affordance is, one may speculate, the psychology which links predisposition to setting’ 
(2006: 59).   
Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke 1997) is about preventing crime by effective environmental 
manipulation. Usually, where the risk for the offender is increased and the rewards from the 
crime reduced, the crime can be prevented. Crime affordances, however, will differ according to 
whether an open first storey window is perceived as an opportunity to burgle, or simply as 
evidence of a hot day. Other considerations will influence affordance here such as whether the 
individual is thinking about crime and/or whether they are agile enough to get up to (and 
through) the open window .If not, then it is unlikely that the open window will afford the 
possibility of committing burglary for the individual. The point being affordances are not 
homogenous. Indeed affordances vary across people and must be acquired and refined by 
personal or vicarious experience (Pease, 2006).   
We now move to explore how different perceptions of offenders and offending can affect 
affordance. Specifically, how the range of actions available to those charged with identifying and 
investigating them, can be constrained if the common misperception that offenders are offence 
homogenous is adopted. 
Serious offenders: Offence homogenous of heterogeneous? 
To view serious offenders as offence homogenous is superficially at least an attractive one. 
Logically, if rapists only rape and terrorists only commit terrorism related offences, then it 
makes the understanding of specific crimes more comprehensive and presumably their 
perpetrators more readily identifiable . For example, if rapists are motivated by a different set of 
identifiable reasons and employ different modi operandi to terrorists, than the investigation of 
each will demand different knowledge and skill. Likewise, crime prevention, criminal 
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investigation and offender rehabilitation can then be tailored specifically to the type of crime 
committed and not to the individual circumstances of the offence (Roach, 2009).  
In theory the fight against crime would be easier in a world where individuals displayed only 
homogeneous offending. Easier it might be, but does the research literature on criminal careers 
support such a perception of serioius offenders and their offences?  
 
Criminal careers research 
In his classic study of the careers of ‘criminal types’ in California in the late 1960s, John Irwin 
found that each was defined by their distinctive offending patterns. For example, thieves 
engaged in theft, burglary or robbery; hustlers in various types of fraud and deception; dope 
fiends in drug related offences and so forth, suggesting that the criminals in this study at least 
specialized in their offending (Irwin, 1970). Offence specialisation can be described as ‘the 
tendency to repeat the same offence type on successive crimes’ (Fisher and Ross, 2006, p.151). 
Fisher and Ross go on to suggest that identifying offence specialisation is important because,  
 
If being a robber is a specialized way of being a criminal, in the same way that being a 
plumber is a specialized form of legitimate employment, then it makes sense to try to 
understand crime in terms of distinctive forms of recruitment and training, specialized 
knowledge and expertise, and its expression in distinctive forms of criminal behaviour 
that are stable over time (Fisher and Ross, 2006, p.152).  
 
As will be discussed, whether offenders specialize (or not) in their offending holds no little 
importance for broader criminological explanations and crime control, including preventing and 
countering acts of terrorism (addressed more comprehensively in the final section of this 
chapter). If, overall, studies of criminal careers point to a high degree of offence specialisation, 
then crime should be responded to in ways which target specific motivations and behaviours of 
particular criminal types. Criminal careers can be then used to predict future offending 
(Armstrong, 2008). Such as, what makes robbers rob, what makes violent criminals violent, or 
even what makes a terrorist. Evidence of high offence specialisation makes emergent methods 
of identifying serious offenders such as self-selection policing a much less attractive prospect 
(Roach, 2007a, 2007b).  
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The self-selection policing approach rests on the premise that ‘those that do big bad things also 
do little bad things’, and often more frequently (Roach, 2007a). Specific minor offences are 
identified as being useful flag offences of more concurrent serious 
1
criminality, such as illegal 
parking in disabled bays (Chenery, Henshaw and Pease, 1999), and non-compliance with the 
Home Office Road Transport 1 form (Roach, 2007b). However, if bank robbers baulk at extortion 
or parking on double-yellow lines, then such an approach based on offence heterogeneity falls 
down. Some suggestions for how self-selection policing might be best employed to uncover 
terrorists are made in the final section of the chapter.  
 
To revisit, if a high degree of offence versatility is found (i.e. no specialisation) then crime 
appears a more generalizable phenomenon resting on classicist ideas such as rational choice 
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986), general explanations for crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1988) and 
Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Here it is the presence of crime opportunities 
that are the preferred explanation, rather than, for example, offenders having specialist 
knowledge or skill.  
 
The criminal careers literature, with its central focus on identifying whether offenders are more 
offence versatile than specialist, may be equally crucial when looking at perceptions of terrorists 
and their offending. If those charged with preventing and countering terrorist acts do generally 
perceive terrorists to be offence homogenous when they are not, then as a consequence, this 
affords them a narrower range of possible actions than if they perceive them  offence versatile. 
For the terrorist, of course, the opposite might be true, with more actions seemingly available to 
them when they perceive those trying to counter them as believing them to be offence 
homogenous. To risk repetition, why should they worry about being caught speeding if police 
and Security Service personnel think that they only commit acts of terrorism and not other types 
of crime?   
 
                                                          
1
 In England and Wales, if, when stopped by police, the driver of a vehicle cannot produce required 
documents (i.e. certificate of insurance and the Ministry of Transport certificate (vehicle safety check) then 
they are issued with a Home Office Road Transport form 1 (HORT1). This compels them to present the 
necessary documents at a police station within 7 days. Roach (2007b) found ‘non-compliance’ to be 
indicative of active concurrent criminality. 
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Dedicated research probing counter-terrorism agency and terrorist perceptions of offence 
homogeneity is both called for and outlined at the end of this chapter. We move first to explore 
whether the criminal careers literature favours offence specialiazion over versatility, or whether 
this should itself be considered a false dichotomy. 
 
Leonore Simon, in ‘Do criminal offenders specialize in crime types?’, considers offence 
specialisation not only to be a ‘myth’ but one “perpetuated by researchers and legal actors who 
emphasise the heinous homicides perpetuated by the offender while playing down other forms 
of criminality” (Simon, 1997, p.35). As an example, he cites the varied and extensive criminal 
career of US serial killer, Henry Lee Lucas, at the expense of Lucas’ most heinous crimes (Simon, 
1997, p.35). By ‘researchers’ one trusts he means those investigating  criminal careers, and 
there is merit in his appraisal as arguably such researchers have tended to neglect minor 
offences and those which do not readily fit into neat crime categories (Roach, 2007a, 2007b). 
 
Traditionally criminologists have expended a lot of energy trying to distinguish whether career 
criminals are specialists’ or ‘generalists’ (e.g. Blumstein et al., 1986; Tarling 1993) because it has 
important implications.  Armstrong (2008), for example, suggests that if offenders specialise, 
then knowledge of past offences can be used to predict later offence types, and that treatment 
policies can be ‘type specific’ (Armstrong, 2008). Some have gone so far as to say that this has 
plagued criminology, consistently leading to disappointing results (Simon, 1997; Soothill et al.; 
2000; Soothill, Fitzpatrick and Francis, 2009). Others suggest instead that criminologists must 
abandon their insistence on the false dichotomy that offenders are either specialists or 
generalists (versatile in their offences), in the face of overwhelming evidence that says they can 
be and indeed are both (Soothill et al., 2000, p. 57).  
 
Soothill et al. (2000) focused on the criminal careers of over 7000 sex offenders (who are 
thought generally to be the most ‘specialized’ of serious criminals) and found evidence of 
differences in offence specialisation and versatility between different groups of sex offender. 
For example, males convicted of underage sexual intercourse (statutory rape) had a versatility 
that took in the full spectrum of criminality. Whereas, those convicted of indecency between 
males were more infrequent re-offenders, and if reconvicted this tended to be for the same 
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offence (i.e. indecency between males). The point being that ‘sex offender’ is perhaps more of 
an ‘umbrella term’ than a description of a homogenous group.   
 
Soothill et al. (2000) concluded from their study of sex offenders that with regard to criminal 
careers, criminologists need to recognise that offending specialisation and generalisation 
(versatility) exist at two levels, sex offenders may be specialists, generalists or both (Soothill, 
Fitzpatrick and Francis, 2009). They sum this up by way of a wonderful analogy (for those of us 
who follow sport anyway). 
 
A person may play many sports, but specialize in football with a favoured position of 
centre forward. A person can, indeed, be regarded as a versatile sportsperson and a 
specialist football centre forward at the same time. A sex offender can behave in the 
same way (2000, p. 57). 
 
Crime categories used can have a big effect on whether a criminal career is considered offence 
homogenous. For example, the criminal career of an individual with previous offences for shop-
theft  but who’s next offence is to steal a car, can equally be considered offence homogenous 
(as all his crimes are related to the theft of property), or as offence heterogeneous (the taking of 
a vehicle without consent of the owner being a different category of crime).  For the sake of 
brevity we will not expand here; it suffices to say that how crimes are recorded will have a 
dramatic affect on perceptions of offence homogeneity and heterogeneity in a criminal career.  
 
Another important aspect of a criminal career concerns offending escalation, that is, do career 
criminals move from minor to serious criminality as their career progresses - sometimes termed 
the ‘graduation hypothesis’. It has been suggested "a belief in escalation is probably the most 
widely held view of the patterns of criminal careers" (Blumstein et al., 1986, p.84). One 
commonly accepted description suggests escalation is  the tendency for offenders to move to 
more serious offence types as offending continues" (Blumstein et al. 1986, p. 8). Loeber and Le 
Blanc (1990) suggest that there are many ways in which quantitative changes (e.g. degree, 
direction and velocity) as well as qualitative changes (e.g. conservation and paths) in offending 
can be shown above and beyond mere escalation. They criticise the 'offending cycle' as being 
too narrowly pre-occupied with the increasing seriousness of the offence and the tendency for 
offenders to modify their offending both quantitatively and qualitatively as they continue to 
offend throughout their career. Offenders can and do 'de-escalate' their offending, for example, 
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by choice, lack of opportunity or incarceration, both in frequency and/or in seriousness. This 
lends support to the premise that serious offenders commit a wide range of offences, including 
more routine minor ones. The alternative being that those offenders who ‘graduate’ to serious 
offending then only commit serious offences thereafter. This is difficult to imagine. Escalation, 
therefore, should not be considered the only way of characterising an offending cycle. It is more 
instructive to think of a triangular distribution, with high seriousness offences more often being 
associated with a range of offences of lesser seriousness (Roach, 2009). 
 
Our brief foray into the criminal careers literature strongly suggests that offenders (particularly 
those that commit crimes of a serious nature) tend to be offence heterogenous (e.g. Wolfgang 
et al.,1972; Piquero, 2000). That is, they display versatility with regard to the types of offences 
they commit. David Farrington, the main proponent of criminal careers research in the UK rather 
pragmatically concludes, 
 
There is a small but significant degree of specialisation, superimposed on a great deal of 
versatility (Farrington et al., 1988, p.483). 
 
 
The research evidence from criminal career studies, therefore, strongly suggests that although 
offenders do sometimes specialize, they are generally far more offence versatile than perceived.   
 
An important further and related point with regard to affordance and serious criminals is 
therefore, whether this perception is shared by those charged with preventing and countering 
their actions, and equally by the criminals themselves. Before exploring whether the perception 
of terrorists by counter-terrorism agencies is one which favour s terrorists as offence 
homogenous (specialists) over offence heterogeneous, a study of police perceptions of offence 
homogeneity is presented. The last section of this chapter explores how counter-terrorism 
agency perceptions of terrorist offence homogeneity might be considered analogous to 
perceptions of offence homogeneity held by police. 
 
Police peceptions of offence homogenity  
In an as yet unpublished  study of police perceptions of offending patterns, Roach (2009) asked 
police officers of various rank, to predict the likelihood of offence homogeneity for a second 
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offence type from a given first offence. Put simply, they were asked to express, as a percentage, 
how likely an offender was to commit a second offence of the same type as their first. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA test was carried out in order to identify any differences in 
participant predictions of homogenous re-offending.  Results showed that the differences in 
predicted likelihood of re-offending was unlikely to have arisen by chance F(9,369)= 7.47, 
p=0.001, eta=0.56) with 56% of the variation in error scores accounted for by the differences in 
predictions of homogenous re-offending according to first offence type. On the whole,  police 
tended to grossly over-estimate the offence homogeneity of offenders, irrespective of type of 
offender and offence given.   
Tarling (1993) used reconviction data and found that the offences of violence, burglary and 
theft, showed the highest degree of specialisation. Although when taken as a whole the findings 
of Roach (2009) echoed this, police predictions were much higher across all the crime types 
asked. For example, Tarling (1993) found that about half the crime types had a probability of 
0.25 or less. In the Roach (2009) study, no police predictions of offence homogeneity 
(specialisation) were below a probability of 0.4, suggesting that police tended to over-estimate 
offence homogeneity across all crime types.  Put simply, police in this study considered all 
offences to be specialized, whereby the offender was more likely to commit a next offence of 
the same type irrespective of the crime committed. The implications of this finding are 
addressed later in the chapter. 
While there was on average an overestimation of specialization demonstrated by police, the 
measures of dispersion showed that there was huge variation in officer judgements, with some 
officers considering certain crimes far more specialized than others (Roach, 2009). For example, 
the range went from an officer who believed that any second offence would be the same as the 
first in 24% of cases where there was a second offence, to another who believed that any 
second offence would be of the same type as the first in every single case. Perhaps this 
incidental finding, that officers have widely different assumptions about the progression of the 
criminal career, is at least as important as the overestimation of homogeneity. Whether by 
overestimating homogeneity or simply having widely dispersed views, the use of prior 
criminality to inform risk of future criminality appears limited.  Indeed, Tarling (1993) found 
what he terms ‘stationarity’ in criminal careers in that the offender was no more likely to 
commit the same next offence type whether it was early in a career (e.g. offences two to three) 
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or later (e.g. offences  six to seven). This is of no little importance where a common perception 
is that offenders increase in specialisation.  
In the Roach (2009) study police participants were also asked to predict the likely next offence 
type for 20 different offence history scenarios. Correlational anlaysis of the prediction scores 
across all offence history scenarios indicated, in all cases, that the most likely next offence 
coincided with the offence history given. Where, for example, the offence history scenario 
detailed violence and burglary, then violence and burglary were consistently predicted to be the  
most likely next offences. Burglary was the highest predicted next offence in both scenarios 
where burglary was listed, suggesting that in making predictions of next offences participants 
were using a common offending schema based, probably based on their experience and 
knowledge of past offenders. 
This interpretation is supported further when, for example, it was noted that violence was the 
second highest prediction in a scenario where it was included in the offence history, but 
dropped considerably to only the fifth highest prediction in a scenario where the offence history 
was comprised of only burglary offences. This was also the case for robbery and public order 
offences probably because of their links in officers’ minds with violent crime. Prediction of 
burglary as next offence, in contrast, increased in the burglary only scenario, as did predictions 
of theft and fraud, offences not usually associated with violence but associated with illegally 
acquiring the property of another. Police predictions remained unchanged across the two 
scenarios for drink driving, drugs, sexual and motoring offences, suggesting that the specific 
offence histories given had little (or no) influence on predictions. It is interesting that sexual and 
drug offences predictions did not appear to correlate with violence when research on 
reconviction patterns suggests that they often do (Cunliffe and Shepherd, 2007).  
Now to summarise the important implications of these studies. The  Roach (2009) study found 
that all police next offence predictions consistently favoured offence homogeneity across all 
offence history scenarios. This strongly suggests that an individual’s type of previous offence 
was considered the best predictor of their future types of offending, irrespective of the type of 
offence history presented.  Comparison with reconviction data shows this to be a gross over-
estimation of offence homogeneity by police in this study at least. For example, reconviction 
data shows that those convicted for violent offences are found to be the least likely to be 
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reconvicted for any type of offence (Cunliffe and Shepherd, 2007).  Put another way, Roach 
(2009) suggests that police generally appear to have a grossly over-estimated perception of 
offence homogeneity and although not tested for directly in this study, there is no reason to 
suggest that police perceptions of terrorists is likely not to be one of offence homogeneity. 
Some supporting evidence may be found when one looks at the organisation of operational 
policing. 
It is common for police facing the challenges posed by serious offenders to organise along 
categories of serious crime, by creating dedicated teams of officers charged with combatting 
specific types of serious crime and serious offender, for example drugs, robbery, vice and 
terrorism squads (Schneider, 2005: Roach, 2009). This suggests a collective police perception of 
serious offenders as offence homogeneous, as for example, those with a history of robbery 
demand the attention of the robbery squad as ‘robbers’, with potential for other offence types 
overlooked. Overestimation of offence homogeneity will result in the crime versatile robber not 
being identified as a candidate for the burglaries, drugs and motoring  offences he commits – or 
the burglary or drug offender escaping attention as a possible suspect for the robbery.  
The logical and analogous question to ask here is if the police, counter-terrorism agancies and 
the general public’s perceptions (and so affordance) of terrorists are equally likely to be one of 
over-estimation of offence homogeneity, as was found with police officers and more 
mainstream offending. In the last section it is suggested why dedicated research along the lines 
of Roach (2009) is necessary in order to explore perceptions of terrorists as offence 
homogenous, and how slef-selection might be employed against the terrorist. 
Terrorists, counter-terrorism and an over-estimation of offence-homogeneity? 
The following extract is taken from a review of the intelligence on the London terrorist attacks 
on the 7
th
 July 2005, by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC); 
MI5 have told the Committee that they could easily have verified the information that 
they had and formally identified who UDM E was, but there was no reason to take this 
formal step because of what they thought he was. There was nothing at the time to 
suggest that UDMs D or E were no more than small time fraudsters who had some 
minor contact with the CREVICE plotters. MI5 did not, therefore, verify the details they 
had on the men or open “personal files” for them. There was nothing, at the time, to 
suggest that MI5 should divert resources away from investigations of known terrorist 
plots in order to investigate someone whom they believed was a minor criminal 
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(Intelligence and Security Committee report, 2009, Could 7/7 have been prevented? 
paragraph 84). 
 
The review report concluded that at the time, the Security Service was correct in its assessment 
of UDMs D and E as simply ‘minor criminals’ and ‘small time fraudsters’. As such, the perception 
was that they did not pose any significant threat and therefore did not warrant the more 
security resource intensive categories ‘essential’ or ‘desirable’ targets. Essentially it seems that 
in the terms used in this paper these people were perceived as being offence homogenous, 
small time common criminals. The individuals (UDMs) in question were Mohammed Siddique 
Khan and Shazad Tanweer, two of the four bombers that took the 52 lives in the terrorist attacks 
on London in 2005.  
 
The point being made here is not that suspect prioritization decisions are made solely on 
perceptions of offence specialization, but that assumptions of terrorist criminal careers  (such as 
specialisation) are likely to play some part in the process. Dedicated criminal career research 
(perhaps analogous to Roach, 2009) is urgently needed which tests and, where necessary 
challenges, such assumptions. 
 
A suggestion that terrorists are perhaps more offence heterogenous in their criminality, was 
made in a recent report on the Coroner’s Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, 
where the report author, the Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Hallett, was more skeptical about the 
assessment of Khan and Tanweer as ‘common criminals’. While acknowledging the possible 
confounding influence that hindsight affords, she raises doubt over whether the Security Service 
assessment of the two men at the time and was indeed correct, thereby questioning the ISC 
review finding;  
 
There is considerable force in Mr Patrick O’Connor’s submission that if they were 
dismissed as common criminals that would have been a mistake. (Rt. Hon Lady Justice 
Hallett, 2011:18) 
 
There is also evidence that some terrorists commit more mainstream criminal offences 
preceding, during and after acts of terrorism. A powerful example is that of Jamal Ahmidan who 
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was stopped for speeding en route to Madrid on the morning of March 11
th
, 2004
2
. Had the 
details he gave police been properly checked and the trunk of his stolen car been searched by 
the officer, they would not only have become suspicious, but would have found a large quantity 
of explosives destined to be used as part of an attack on the Spanish railway system which killed 
191 people and injured 1800 others, a few hours later.   
 
Although the Madrid bomber example maybe considered over-dramatic it serves to illustrate 
the importance of understanding perceptions of terrorist offending and in turn terrorist 
perceptions of those perceptions. Which as affordance, will affect his/her decision making. If as, 
hypothesised, perceptions of terrorist offending over-estimate homogeneity, then it is equally 
likley that terrorists also perceive this to be the case and their thinking and behaviour is affected 
accordingly. For example, if the general perception of terrorists is that they only engage in acts 
of terrorism, then it is possible that some will not baulk at committing other types of crimes. 
Why? Because if there exisits a percpetion of an over-estimation of their offence homogeneity 
then it unlikely that other crime will uncover them as terrorists. So what am I suggesting 
exactly? 
What is needed is a dedicated criminal career research programme for terrorist suspects which 
focuses on; 
1. Counter-terrorist agencies’ perceptions of terrorist offence homogeneity and compares 
them with the criminal records of known or suspected terrorists - perhaps research 
comparable with thatconducted with police perceptions by  Roach (2009). It is likley that 
counter-terrorism agencies and personnel are analogous to police in that they are not 
homogenous in their perceptions of terrorist offence homogeneity. This needs to be 
explored as the implication follows that if the case then counter-terrorism practice will 
differ across agencies and individuals and therefore so will practice and policy. 
 
2. Identifying minor offences committed  frequently by terrorist suspects. That is the 
identification of those more mainstream criminal offences found most indicative of 
those engagng in terrorism. Police and counter-terrorism agencies could then 
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legitimately placelce more scrutiny on those individuals as they have self-selected by 
virtue of committing a ‘trigger-offence’.  Self-selection policing can only be employed 
when trigger offences have been identified (see Roach, 2007a, 2007b). Some offences 
will be directly related to the planning and execution of acts, for example, stealing cars 
to be used as bombs, and some will be less directly obvious, for example, parking 
illegally outside a possible target in order to assess the security response. In the same 
way that it is incumbant on horticultural suppliers to inform the necessary agencies 
when individuals try to purchase a tonne of fertiliser (when they only  have a window 
box at their flat), or the suppliers of hairderssing products that an individual is trying to 
purchase a large amount of hydrogen peroxide (but they do not cut hair or own a salon), 
the idenification of those ‘trigger offences’ for those engaging in terrorism will make it 
incombant on police more frequently to  thoroughly  scrutinise those who commit them. 
This could be as easy as looking in the trunk of cars of those caught speeding. This is the 
the essence of the self-selection policing approach (Roach, 2007a, 2007b) and it 
promises to be equallyuseful when employed to help uncover and indentify those 
planning and executing acts of terrorism (Roach2009). 
 
An important distinction must be made between the use of minor offences as legitimate means 
by which known suspects are targeted, and self-selection policing. Self-selection policing is 
concerned with identifying minor trigger offences most indicative of active concurrent serious 
offending. That is, those minor offences which if targeted will yield a significant number of 
active serious offenders (Roach, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). For example, those who park illegally in 
disabled bays (Chenery et al, 1999).  Using minor offences committed by known criminals (or 
terrorist suspects) as a legitimate means by which police attention is focused on them is wholly 
different. Al Capone was imprisoned for tax evasion not because his tax evasion uncovered him 
as a gangster, but because it was all the authorities could pin on him even though he was a well 
known gangster (Roach, 2009).  
As long as terrorists percieve the perception of them to be one of offence homogeneity, then 
methods such as self-selection policing should become more attractive propositions for those 
charged with identifying and countering them. Equally important for counter-terrorists agencies 
is determing the extent to which terrorist suspect prioritisation (risk) assessments are influenced 
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by an over-estimation of offence homogeneity. One hopes that the discounting of two of the 
London Bombers as priority suspects was an both an isolated incident and one not simply driven 
by their percieved status as just ‘minor offenders’. Again, dedicated research on terrorist 
criminal careers and counter-terrorism perceptions is necessary to test such hypotheses. 
Indeed, the first hurdle to overcome is of course finding out whether counter-terrorism agencies 
and personnel do indeed perceive terrorists as offence homogenous and, as a consequence, 
whether such an affordance is acting to constrain their actions. Until a dedicated research 
programme focused on the actual and perceived criminal careers of terrorists is conducted then 
we shall never know. And the possible utility of self-selection policing to counter-terrorism 
never realised. 
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